A Berlin-based political analyst with a decade of experience covering European affairs and a passion for investigative journalism.
The UK government is testing out a new stance on leaving the EU, though this should not be confused with a policy reversal. The modification is primarily tonal.
In the past, Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves described Britain's detachment from Europe as a permanent feature of the national situation, awkward to handle perhaps, but ultimately unavoidable. Now, they are prepared to admit it as a serious problem.
Speaking at a regional investment conference this week, the chancellor included EU withdrawal together with the pandemic and spending cuts as factors behind ongoing financial stagnation. She repeated this viewpoint during an IMF meeting in the US capital, observing that the national efficiency issue has been worsened by the way in which the UK left the European Union.
This represented a carefully worded declaration, attributing harm not to the departure decision but to its implementation; blaming the officials who handled it, not the public who supported it. This distinction is essential when the financial plan is unveiled soon. The aim is to assign certain economic problems to the deal negotiated by Boris Johnson without seeming to disrespect the aspirations of leave voters.
Among evidence-focused observers, the economic argument is largely settled. An independent fiscal watchdog estimates that the UK's sustained output is four percent reduced than it would have been with continued EU membership.
In addition to the costs of trade friction, there has been a sustained decline in corporate spending due to governmental uncertainty and regulatory ambiguity. There was also the lost potential of administrative effort being redirected toward a task for which no preparation had been made, since few proponents had seriously considered the practical implications of making it happen.
With evidence being clear, officials find it hard to stay impartial. The Bank of England governor told a recent international forum that he takes no side on Brexit before adding that its impact on growth will be negative for the foreseeable future.
He forecast a slight positive adjustment over the long term, which provides scant relief to a chancellor who must address a major funding gap soon. Tax increases are planned, and the chancellor wants the citizens to understand that Brexit is a partial cause.
The statement is worth making because it is true. This doesn't ensure political benefit from saying it. This truth was apparent when the administration presented its earlier fiscal plan and during the national vote, which Labour fought while sidestepping the certainty of higher levies.
At this stage, with the government being established but unpopular, explaining economic hardship comes across as making excuses to numerous constituents. There might be more advantage in blaming the Conservatives for everything if they were the only alternative and a serious challenger. The classic incumbent strategy in a two-party system is to claim cleanup duty the previous administration's mess and warn against their return. The rise of Reform UK complicates matters.
Policy differences between the main opponents are small, but voters notice personal rivalry more than ideological alignment. Supporters of the Reform leader due to lost faith in the system—especially on border policy—don't see Reform and the Tories as similar entities. One party has a history of allowing immigration, while Reform does not—a difference their leader will consistently highlight.
Farage is less eager to talk about EU exit, partly because it is a legacy shared with Conservatives and partly because there are no positive outcomes to highlight. If challenged, he may contend that the vision was undermined by flawed implementation, but even that explanation admits failure. Easier to change the subject.
This clarifies why Labour feels increasingly assured raising the issue. Starmer's address to supporters marked a significant shift. Earlier, he had addressed UK-EU relations in dry, technical terms, focusing on a relationship reset that targeted non-controversial trade barriers like border inspections while steering clear of the sensitive topics at the core of the Brexit aftermath.
In his speech, Starmer did not fully embrace pro-EU arguments, but he hinted at familiarity with past claims. He mentioned "Brexit lies on the side of that bus"—alluding to exit supporters' vows about NHS funding—in the context of "dubious solutions" promoted by politicians whose simplistic answers exacerbate the country's challenges.
Departure from the EU was equated with the pandemic as traumas faced by ordinary people in recent years. Likening EU exit to an illness indicates a hardening of rhetoric, even if the financial steps being negotiated in EU headquarters remain the same.
The aim is to connect Farage to a well-known example of political mis-selling, suggesting he cannot be trusted; that he exploits discontent and creates conflict but lacks governing competence.
Recent suspensions of local representatives from Reform's local government team supports that narrative. Leaked footage of a video conference showed internal disputes and blame-shifting, highlighting the difficulties amateurs face when delivering public services on limited budgets—much harder than distributing leaflets about reducing inefficiency or controlling immigration.
This criticism is productive for the government, but it depends on the administration's own performance being sufficiently strong that electing Reform seems a risky gamble. Additionally, this is a strategy for a later election that may not occur until the end of the decade. If Starmer and Reeves wish to appear as alternatives to populism, they must demonstrate meanwhile with a clear, constructive program of their own.
Restrictions exist to what can be achieved with a rhetorical shift, and time is short. How much easier to make the case today that EU exit is harmful and his promoter untrustworthy if they had said so earlier. What additional choices might they have? Should they receive credit for acknowledging it today when alternate justifications are exhausted? Yes. But the issue with arriving at the evident truth via the most circuitous route is that observers wonder the delay. Beginning with honesty is faster.
A Berlin-based political analyst with a decade of experience covering European affairs and a passion for investigative journalism.